Development news - Africa
DICEY ZIMBABWE : INTERNATIONAL COMMUNTY HASN’T YET LEARN FROM AFRICAN CONFLICT CAUSES
30th June 2009
Bernard Owusu – Sekyere

Today, we are witnessing a period that some African leaders have become target for arrest and other on trial and possibly others under surveillance. The hullabaloo about dealing with African leaders has been lauded by section of African scholars and at the same time raised eye-brows among other African leaders, not excluding Africa Union. Issues surrounding the international move to deal drastically with recalcitrant African leaders is about extreme violence that their regime sanctioned or has permitted against political opponents, especially, innocent civilians. From Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Chad, and current the warrant of arrest over Omar Al Bashir. Whilst this paper support justice irrespective of the status of a person, the objective is locating what lesson international community has failed to learn which is likely to repeat in Zimbabwe despites current resolve by the three leaders to avoid violence as means to achieve political ends. I have argued in earlier article that civil wars are likely to happen when the leaders are resolved to allow that to happen, but then it become difficult unless it get external support of third party in terms of resource for armed violence. Whilst the absence of such support, actually contributed to forestalling full-scale war in Zimbabwe, current stance on continues sanctions can rather reverse the process of peace in Zimbabwe. Sanction, in UN records hasn’t proven to be remedy after all to stop aberrant state leaders. Why should sanctions that threatened regional peace be encouraged in Africa?
Several civil wars had succeeded in being started because international community either ignored the needed earlier intervention such as the Liberian and Rwanda civil wars, or contributed in profiting from such war by providing conduit of arms supplies to provoke inception, an example being the DRC and Ivoirian civil wars. Many war mongering leaders have enjoyed immunity and such privilege no longer exist in the international political arena for ‘emerging nations’ leaders, nevertheless, neither is the current international punitive measures signalling any threat to potential aberrant leaders. The year 2008 into 2009 had seen instances of two coups in West Africa and the ongoing Madagascar Rajolina versus Ravalo Manana. The disapproval of Rajolina’s government by SADC and the Western world has done nothing in restoring Manana to power. The hanging charges of corruption in abstaintia complicates the issue for external mediation of the Madagascar political conflict. Ignoring the matter would signal ineffectiveness of the sub-regional force. This can affect some future incidents requiring similar intervention and mediation.
Considering these recent events, the African political scene remains fragile requiring enormous effort by regional and sub-regional organisations to become firm on their approach in dealing with some of the violent political conflict and political developments. The case of Zimbabwe, which is the focus in the article has already proved problematic for SADC and the AU. The level of refugees influx into other SADC states, the incidence of cholera epidemic and the collapse of the economy of Zimbabwe as another key centralised state in the SADC sub-region threatened entire regional stability. The deterioration of conditions in Zimbabwe has come about as result of ineffective sanctions. The ossification of the Zimbabwean incumbency has toughened due to sanctions from international donor partners. Whilst I don’t subscribe to these donor recipient relationship between Africa and the West, Zimbabwe had been a donor dependant state as the norm in Africa. Unfortunately, Mugabe loud voice ignored the fact of his collateral need of foreign aid. Uncle Mugabe’s sovereignty couldn’t be taller than his dependency needs. It appears Africa has been born in the form of two equal twins, one is the proverbial leech and the other sovereignty. Surprisingly, leech has outgrown Sovereignty. This African dilemma, Uncle Mugabe failed to take notice and unfortunately, unlike Venezuelan Chavez, the Mugabean revolution has suffered only sanctions asphyxiation but not casualty yet.
Sanctions against Mugabe was orchestrated by Britain with MDC leaders either calling for it or supporting them. From the West to Aussie, sanctions against Mugabe regime in terms of needed donor aid, bilateral loans and travel ban were imposed. The unfortunate result has been that the citizens are the ultimate sufferers of the consequence of the sanctions.
Political sanction which the international community applies has two main purpose firstly, is to weaken the government grip on power, and secondly, to maximise internal pressure on the aberrant government to resign. Many such sanctions have normally failed to achieve the objective or just minimal degree of success which normally as mentioned had severe impact rather on the ordinary citizen who have to be protected. Currently, sanctions haven’t made any difference in North Korea. American life-long sanction against Cuba Castro regime had no much effect to reduce the regime grip on power. American sanctions against Venezuela hasn’t yielded any effect in causing internal rebellion. In fact, sanctions against tyrants and authoritarian regimes normally strengthen such regimes. Under sanctions Cuba exported skills and provided financial and military support to many developing states. Furthermore, sanctions against Myanmar remain to achieve any impact on the government. What lesson and new approach could be used against entrenched regimes such as Mugabe’s one in Zimbabwe hasn’t been considered yet by the international community.
A campaign in June 2009 by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has failed to undo the sanction imposed by Western donors. Obama’s promised aid wouldn’t go directly into the government coffers. The reason for the lifting imposed sanctions by the Western donors is now conditional to seeing Mugabe out from office. This conditions disregarding the situation of humanitarian and security issues can reverse the process of achieving stability in Zimbabwe. It is also reasonable for donors to argue that they cannot provide funds that Zimbabwean entrenched politicians may use to enhance their comfortable living. No amount of guarantee from Tsvangirai could undo the lack of trust by Western donors in a government of MDC-ZANU-PF combination. The continued economic strangulation of Zimbabwe in its post-conflict state can give wrong signal for destabilisation. In the given dicey situation in Zimbabwe, what should be done to achieve internal stability without offending Western donors with regard to political personalities?
Two key options remain to be considered for the dicey state of Zimbabwe in post-conflict governance. The confrontational approach which requires all Zimbabwean leaders to unite for the interest of their country and ignore the issue of Western aid. In this case the Castro-Chavez approach of self-reliance becomes crucial though has long-term benefit of overcoming excessive dependency on donor funding. In this case, it is inevitable for the unity government to succeed by getting all skilled Zimbabweans to return and work for restoring Zimbabwean economy. The returnees should be ready to make some sacrifice with regard to poor salaries in the mean time. The critical problem for Zimbabwe will be market in the West will still be closed, but it can explore intra-state trade with quality and cheaper products. The Sino-Russia and Arab market may not be closed and it is equally larger. The Latin-American market may be open through better off-set deals or trade-offs. The country should encourage consumption of locally produced food and other products cutting down on nonessential imports.
The second option for Zimbabwe dicey situation can be tough but satisfactory to Western donors. The public and civil service should lay down tools until Uncle Mugabe scribble his retirement letter to Parliament and the Chief Justice. This should exclude partisan issues rather become a national move to save the country. A partisan approach can be self suicidal by triggering violence and reprisal. Refusal to strike will mean economic starvation without donor or Western aid flowing into Zimbabwe. The extent to which foreign aid can restore the economy is another question. Available evidence on the ground shows, foreign aid and not even the African debt cancellation has succeeded in turning around African economies. Revived and sustaining the economy can be achieved through robust government that understands what Zimbabwe critically need to do, and focus on priorities and prudent spending by valuing local resources and creation of local and regional markets.
The end note is that Zimbabwe is in a dicey position more than ever and it will take only a strategic decision that is confrontational or public rebellion that gathers its momentum as non-partisan. As the saying goes, sometime there is need to temper justice with mercy. Zimbabwe has achieved peace that need to be nurtured not only by Zimbabweans alone, but the international community need to make way for Zimbabweans to learn from their own mistakes. That cannot happen peacefully in the midst of Western sanctions. A better approach to oust Mugabe by targeting Zimbabwean population is unfortunate. And that has a tendency to reverse the process of ongoing political convenience marriage for peace. Zimbabwe peace isn’t required for the country alone but the entire SADC and Africa.
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